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Approaches to Crisis-Preventing and Conflict-Sensitive Development Cooperation
Background to the current debate
Crisis prevention and conflict management have been seized
upon in the past 5 to 10 years as an issue for development
cooperation and taken root as a goal for political action. Al-
though the basic idea that development cooperation always
seeks to be a policy of peace is by no means new, what is new
is its attempt to make direct contributions to peaceful devel-
opment in conflict situations. This concern is no longer just
an overriding, abstract goal: it is meant to be reflected in
specific strategies and measures. The subject gained a new
dimension with the terrorist attacks in the USA on
11 September 2001; the debate on crisis prevention and con-
flict management may provide substantive links in this con-
text.
From the 30 to 50 violent conflicts a year between, but mostly
within, countries it is clear how necessary it is to find con-
structive ways of resolving conflicts. Many countries also
find themselves in a grey area between war and peace, in
which government is undergoing a process of insidious or
overt disintegration. Violent disputes are often the core prob-
lem. Besides causing enormous human suffering, violent
conflicts reverse past progress – including that achieved
through development cooperation – and block opportunities
for future development. They are also a major burden on the
international community (cost of military operations, recon-
struction aid, etc.).
The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 too will have
tremendous consequences for the developing countries –
besides the very serious implications they are having for the
USA. The economic effects are likely to lead to a significant
increase in the number of poor people in the world.
The causes and triggers of conflicts are complex. The fol-
lowing factors have proved to be especially likely to lead to
conflict: socio-economic inequalities, the absence of opportu-
nities for political participation, fragile government structures
and inadequate civil structures, political violence and repres-
sion and competition for scarce resources (land, water, etc.).
How the parties to conflicts perceive such factors is often
crucially important. A feeling of being exposed to “cultural
hegemony” may encourage the use of violence and help to
escalate it. The ethnic or religious instrumentalization of
conflicts seems to be a particularly important factor in ex-
plaining the attraction of terrorist groups. Ethnic rivalry and
dominance, for example, does much to explain the civil war
in Sri Lanka and the spiralling violence that escalated into
genocide in Rwanda in 1994.
• Every year violent disputes occur in the form of domestic and international conflicts in 30 to 50 countries. The
attacks of 11 September 2001 have also revealed the dangers of extreme forms of terrorism. Development policy
must react both to symptoms of crisis and conflict and to terrorism.
• The area of crisis prevention and conflict management has become firmly established in development cooperation
in recent years. It is not an innovation dictated by fashion, but a necessary extension.
• One important empirical conclusion is that development cooperation has an intended and unintended influence on
conflicts. Although the options open to development cooperation for bringing constructive influence to bear should
not be overestimated, some are certainly worth considering. Development cooperation can help to remove the
causes of conflicts and to create opportunities for non-violent conflict resolution. Suitable country strategies (with
account taken of the potential for conflict, etc.), conflict impact assessments and specific measures (such as peace-
promoting projects in the education and media sectors) may help in this respect. Practical conflict-sensitive devel-
opment cooperation is, however, still in its infancy.
• Coherent interaction between development cooperation and other policies (especially foreign policy) is very im-
portant and should be more easily recognizable in practice. Crisis prevention and conflict management are impor-
tant tasks for policy as a whole.
• The contribution that development policy may make to the fight against terrorism is a new and extremely difficult
challenge. Above all, development cooperation may help to deprive terrorist groups of their breeding ground by
removing the structural causes of conflict and to increase the legitimacy of government structures and their ability
to function.
Definitions
Crisis prevention comprises measures aimed at the under-
lying causes of conflicts (such as economic disparities be-
tween different population groups). Conflict management
seeks to tackle factors of direct relevance to conflicts (e.g.
by having a constructive influence on the conduct of actors
prepared to use violence). Crisis prevention is thus geared
to the long term, while conflict management is predomi-
nantly attuned to the short and medium term and relevant in
rather tense crisis situations.
2In countries where there is no effective state monopoly on the
use of force (Somalia, Sudan, Liberia, etc.) groups often have
economic motives for perpetuating unstable conditions and
violent conflicts. “Markets of violence” form since systematic
robbery, hostage-taking, illegal trade (in drugs and diamonds,
for example), protection rackets, etc. may be important
sources of income.
The international debate on crisis prevention was largely
triggered by the violent events in Rwanda, Somalia and the
former Yugoslavia in the 1990s and by the questionable reac-
tions of the international community to these events. The
more favourable political environment following the end of
the East-West conflict permitted a debate on prevention in
various areas of policy, whereas most crisis management
strategies had previously been reactive. In 1999 UN Secre-
tary-General Kofi Annan therefore called for a “culture of
prevention”.
Processes of social change and development are always asso-
ciated with conflicts. In general, the aim is therefore not to
prevent conflicts but to find constructive and non-violent
ways of resolving them. Basically, a distinction can be made
between three phases of a conflict:
• the phase in which a conflict emerges and escalates,
where the aim should be to remove causes, to establish
conflict management mechanisms and to prevent vio-
lence (e.g. Kenya’s situation in the 1990s);
• the phase in which the conflict is on-going, where the
emphasis should be placed on containing and ending the
violent conflict (e.g. the Sri Lankan civil war);
• the de-escalation and consolidation phase, where coping
with the consequences of war, reconciliation and the pre-
vention of a renewed escalation of violence are important
(e.g. the situation in Guatemala).
Lessons learned from past development cooperation
Since the mid-1990s a number of bi- and multilateral donors
(Germany, Norway, the World Bank among others) and the
OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) have
carried out country and project studies to determine what
influence development cooperation has on conflict situations.
Past experience can be summarized as follows:
Relative influence of development cooperation: Expectations
of what development cooperation can achieve should not be
pitched too high (the same being true, of course, of other
areas of development cooperation). The responsibility for
preventing or ending conflicts rests mainly with the parties
concerned. In most cases development cooperation will be
unable to prevent or end violent conflicts on its own. It may,
on the other hand, tip the balance between civil and violent
forms of conflict. A German aid and development pro-
gramme, for example, proved to be an important step in
bringing peace to the Tuareg conflict in northern Mali in the
1990s, since it helped to eliminate the causes of the conflict
and to overcome its consequences.
Development cooperation is not neutral in conflicts: Devel-
opment cooperation has an intended and unintended influence
on conflict in partner countries. These effects are identifiable
both at the level of individual measures or project regions
(micro level) and at the level of a country’s overall policy
(macro level). At micro level the question in many partner
countries is whether and, if so, how account has been taken of
the ethnic affiliation of the target groups. There is consider-
able evidence to show that even “purely technical” measures
have a positive or negative impact on social tensions and
conflict situations. In Sri Lanka, for example, various donors
assisted measures forming part of the Mahaweli project that
indirectly supported the ethnically oriented settlement policy
to the disadvantage of the Tamils and so helped to worsen the
conflict. Equally, development cooperation may defuse or
exacerbate conflicts at macro level. The allocation of devel-
opment assistance, for example, is often accompanied by a
political signal to the partner country. In Kenya’s case donors
have occasionally been successful in exerting pressure to
make the country more democratic. In some instances a rele-
vant question is whether development cooperation directly or
indirectly helps to finance a conflict (through the misuse of
funds, for example).
Development cooperation and the fight against terror-
ism
It is not yet possible to say what effect the terrorist attacks
will have on German and international development coop-
eration. Some of the possible implications for development
cooperation were, however, already being discussed imme-
diately after 11 September 2001. The discussion shows that
development cooperation as a whole may become more
important as a result of the new challenges.
The following factors may be of relevance to the current
debate:
• Development cooperation cannot look back on spe-
cific experience of development policy approaches to
combating terrorism. There are, however, numerous
links to the debate on crisis prevention and conflict
management.
• Development cooperation can do hardly anything
about terrorist groups and activities as such, but it can
do something about the environment. It can help to
deprive terrorist groups of their breeding ground by
removing structural causes of conflict.
• Of primary importance are approaches that seek to
increase the legitimacy of government structures and
their ability to function. This helps to ensure that con-
flicts within states are resolved peacefully and that the
state has a monopoly on the use of force, which coun-
ters the spread of violence and the existence of terror-
ist structures. Of relevance in this context is the prob-
lem of failing states.
• In its general form development cooperation promotes
international dialogue and can be put to greater use for
forms of inter- and intra-cultural dialogue.
• In view of the 11 September attacks a question that
has to be discussed is which countries are to be as-
sisted more and which less. This question is complex
because of discernible conflicts of objectives. On the
one hand, more and more development policy stand-
ards to be observed by partner governments and their
policies have been introduced (concerning, for exam-
ple, democratic legitimacy and corruption). At the
same time, German development cooperation has be-
gun to focus on fewer countries. On the other hand,
the goal of combating terrorism will result in devel-
opment cooperation taking account, or taking greater
account, of important cooperation partners where this
task is concerned and in less emphasis being placed on
other principles of development policy (as in Paki-
stan’s case). In the long term, however, the standards
of development policy should continue to be decisive.
3Early warning/conflict recognition: Development cooperation
actors can be useful for conflict recognition because they
have good external structures in partner countries. If any
preventive action at all is to be taken, an adequate knowledge
of the potential for conflict and violence is needed. Early
recognition of conflicts is necessary especially where devel-
opment cooperation intends to help prevent crises (early
warning). Development cooperation paid scant attention to
conflict recognition until the second half of the 1990s. There
are also shortcomings in the reporting and flow of informa-
tion within the development cooperation system and between
development cooperation and foreign policy actors. In some
cases, project staff take no interest in local conflicts in their
reporting because it is unclear, for example, what the conse-
quences might be. The selective perception of information
may result in incorrect or distorted interpretations of conflict
situations, an example being the incorrect perceptions in the
context of the genocide in Rwanda. However, it should be
emphasized that, even where there is a functioning early
warning system and adequate conflict recognition, it is by no
means certain that early political action will automatically
follow.
Policy coordination/coherence: The interplay of different
policies is of the utmost importance for crisis prevention and
conflict management. Development cooperation cannot and
will not replace other political actors. It is dependent on close
cooperation with other policies and between bi- and multilat-
eral donors if it is to be effective. This is true, for example, of
arms exports. There is a particular need for joint country
strategies (in which, say, foreign and development policy
activities are interlinked to de-escalate conflicts) and for
political initiatives (as in the control of small arms). This
entails far closer coordination with diplomatic and, where
appropriate, security policy activities and with other policies
(trade, finance, agriculture and environment) than in the past.
Importance of private actors: Crisis prevention and conflict
management are relevant not only to government bodies but
also to private actors. Groups in civil society originating from
conflict areas are of prime importance because they are very
familiar with regional conditions, they are often well accepted
and they are able to ensure long-term involvement. Non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) operating at international
level are also important actors. The German political founda-
tions, for example, are often active in key areas of society that
are of considerable interest in the context of conflicts (pro-
motion of political “think tanks”, dialogue fora for the parties
to conflicts, etc.). Growing attention is being paid to the im-
portance of local and international private enterprises for
conflict situations. An occasional problem is that armed
groups finance themselves by cooperating with enterprises in
the mining of such easily transported raw materials as dia-
monds and gold in conflict regions, which creates material
incentives to perpetuate conflicts.
Areas of action: attempts to achieve more conflict-
sensitive development cooperation
There are various ways of making development cooperation
more sensitive to conflicts:
Development of strategies: Crisis prevention and conflict
management must be reflected in the development of strate-
gies (country, sectoral and similar strategies). In the context
of country strategies this means considering the following
questions: Is there potential for violence in the partner coun-
try? How does the country programme and the policy dia-
logue take this potential into account? How keenly is the
partner government trying to settle the conflict peacefully?
Does development cooperation offer incentives to de-escalate
the violence? Will the misuse of development cooperation
possibly  increase the capacity  for  the use of  violence? Does
Efforts in German development cooperation to increase
conflict awareness
Various efforts to focus on the subject have been made in
German development cooperation since the mid-1990s, the
most important being the following:
• The Federal government has established an overall con-
cept entitled “Crisis Prevention and Conflict Settlement”
(2000), in which the importance of development policy
is explicitly emphasized.
• To identify the tendency for crises to occur in partner
countries, an indicator model has been developed and
has been in use since 1999. With the aid of various the-
matic areas (disparities in a society, existing capacity for
peaceful conflict management, concepts of the enemy,
etc.) the extent to which there is potential for crisis and
violence and thus a need for preventive action is deter-
mined.
• The Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and
Development (BMZ) has obtained a general insight into
the effects of German development cooperation in con-
flict situations by conducting a series evaluation of six
countries. Pilot studies on the subject have also been un-
dertaken by the German Agency for Technical Coopera-
tion (GTZ) and the German Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (KfW).
• Since 1998 the BMZ has had a seat on the Federal Secu-
rity Council, where it argues in particular for a restrictive
German arms export policy.
• “Development of peace and crisis prevention” is one of
currently ten focal areas of bilateral German develop-
ment cooperation.
• The BMZ has commissioned the GTZ to undertake a
consultancy project having as its objective “the further
development of crisis prevention and conflict manage-
ment concepts and instruments and their exemplary use
in key countries”. A handbook on conflict analysis for
project planning and management and another on the ob-
servation of the impact of development cooperation proj-
ects on conflicts are currently being put to the test.
• A further consultancy project is devoted to the subject of
“small arms control”.
• In 1999 the BMZ created the Civil Peace Service, which
undertakes development and peace work aimed at pro-
moting the non-violent handling of conflicts.
• A fund for peace institutions and initiatives has been
established to promote the practical application of theo-
retical approaches.
• In the BMZ a new Department for Foreign and Security
Policy, the Development of Peace and Crisis Prevention
has been formed (its remit also includes human rights
and research).
• Network structures have been created by the BMZ’s
Working Party on Crisis Prevention and Conflict Man-
agement  through Development Policy (since 2000) and
the Peace Development Group (FriEnt) (since August
2001).
4the regional concentration of development cooperation in the
partner country have implications for existing conflicts?
Coherence: During the development of strategies it should
also become clear at what stages other policies may actively
contribute to crisis prevention and conflict management or
whether development cooperation may support other actors’
initiatives. Efforts should therefore be geared to strategies
jointly implemented with foreign policy and any other rele-
vant policies.
Establishment as a cross-section subject: In many countries
where there is a potential for conflict it will not be possible or
appropriate to establish crisis prevention and conflict man-
agement as a focal area of development cooperation. None-
theless, even in such cases the subject should be taken into
account as a cross-section dimension in procedures, sectoral
strategies, individual measures, etc. Thus a question that
should always be asked in the case of any measure assisted in
such countries as Rwanda, Sri Lanka and Guatemala is
whether the various groups perceive it as favouring or dis-
criminating against them.
Conflict impact assessment: A conflict impact assessment
enables development cooperation to recognize and adjust
effects of its own conduct that are relevant to conflicts. A
conflict impact assessment of this kind should not be confined
to the level of individual measures, although it is often an
important starting point. It should also include the basic de-
velopment cooperation policy towards the partner country
concerned (e.g. policy dialogue) and the development
cooperation portfolio.
Increasing staff awareness: One of the most important
opportunities for making development cooperation more
conflict-sensitive is provided by the initial and advanced
training of domestic, foreign and counterpart staff. Ger-
many and other donors now have a number of major
training programmes devoted to the subject.
Operational measures: At the level of individual projects
and programmes existing and new, conflict-specific meas-
ures can be considered. The existing options include
measures to promote democracy, measures in support of
good governance (rule of law, etc.), measures that encour-
age regional cooperation and measures to reconstruct in-
frastructure destroyed in war. Some of the new specific
measures are:
• support for security sector reforms (democratic con-
trol of the military, demobilization and reintegration
of combatants, etc.),
• containment and control of small arms,
• trauma and reconciliation work (for child soldiers
among others),
• promotion of local groups that contribute to peaceful
conflict management (resolving local land use con-
flicts, providing legal advice, etc.),
• peace-promoting measures in the education and media
sectors.
Dr. Stephan Klingebiel
Department for Principles
of Development Coopera-
tion; Crisis Prevention;
Social Security; Environ-
mental Protection and Sus-
tainable Resource Man-
agement; Region: North
Africa / Middle East
Further reading:
Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation:
http://www.berghof-center.org/ handbook/cf.htm
Klingebiel, S. (1999): Impact of Development Cooperation
in Conflict Situations. Cross-section Report on Evaluations
of German Development Cooperation in Six Countries,
GDI, Berlin
Mehler, A. / C. Ribaux (2000): Crisis Prevention and Con-
flict Management in  Technical Cooperation. An Overview
of the National and International Debate, GTZ, Wiesbaden
OECD/DAC (2001): Helping Prevent Violent Conflict,
Orientations for External Partners, Paris
DEUTSCHES INSTITUT FÜR ENTWICKLUNGSPOLITIK©
GERMAN  DEVELOPMENT  INSTITUTE  ·  INSTITUT  ALLEMAND DE DEVELOPPEMENT
TULPENFELD 4 - D-53113 BONN TELEFON  (0228) 949 27-0 · TELEFAX (0228) 949 27-130
DIE@DIE-GDI.DE ·    WWW.DIE-GDI.DE   ·   ISSN 1434-8934
Approaches adopted by the German Foreign Office
Like the BMZ, the German Foreign Office has added to its
crisis prevention and conflict management measures,
placing the emphasis on (i) civil personnel and physical
support for UN missions, (ii) courses to prepare civil peace
personnel for international missions (e.g. activities of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), (iii)
promotion of international peace processes and conflict
management instruments (e.g. for the International Panel to
Investigate the Genocide in Rwanda) and (iv) support for
individual conflict management, crisis prevention and
peace consolidation projects undertaken by German and
international NGOs.
